Short explanation: This list includes the DNS server changes for the devanholo.com domain from its creation until today.
Before the devanholo.com domain was connected to Cloudflare's DNS servers on September 29, 2024 (denver.ns.cloudflare.com and noor.ns.cloudflare.com), the domain was connected to the following DNS servers:
These servers served as the primary connection servers for the domain before the transfer to Cloudflare, and it is likely that the domain was active on these servers.
This domain is currently active and uses Chinese DNS servers. The registrar information is incomplete, and it may be necessary to make an official request to the registrar (HiChina) for further investigation.
This information can be used for tracking internet crimes, analyzing suspicious activities, or contacting the relevant authorities. For more details, additional tools such as Reverse Lookup or IP Geolocation are available.
The WHOIS tool is used to check ownership and management details of IP addresses. The information provided includes geographical location, the corresponding organization, and technical and administrative contacts. This tool is useful for cyber threat analysis and identifying suspicious sources.
Note: If further follow-up is needed, you can contact the network administrators or the abuse report email provided.
Purpose of this report: To provide accurate information to assist in legal or security investigations by law enforcement.
The WHOIS tool can help identify suspicious sources in cyberattacks and is used to trace anonymous identities on the internet.
The IP address 183.253.57.200 is in the range of 183.192.0.0 to 183.255.255.255, owned by China Mobile Communications Corporation, which is an internet service and mobile communication provider in China.
This email was confirmed on August 16, 2024.
This data is extracted from the WHOIS service provided by APNIC, which provides registered IP address information.
If suspicious or illegal use of this DNS server has been observed, you can contact the responsible parties via the email abuse@chinamobile.com to file a complaint. Additionally, law enforcement can request further information through the provided contact numbers.
Based on a thorough review of HTML code, meta tags, CSS and JavaScript files, and other technical elements, this platform is most likely associated with a Chinese service or website. The following evidence and analysis are presented to support this claim.
The code includes meta tags that are specifically designed for popular browsers in China:
<meta name="x5-fullscreen" content="true">
<meta name="x5-page-mode" content="app">
<meta name="360-fullscreen" content="true">
These meta tags relate to browsers such as QQ Browser and 360 Browser, which are very popular in China. These tags are used to optimize the user experience in these browsers and are rarely seen outside of China.
The code uses the Vant UI library, which is a UI toolkit developed by Chinese programming teams. This library is widely used in web and mobile applications in China and uses Chinese as its default language.
The following meta tags are used to prevent browser caching:
<meta http-equiv="cache-control" content="no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate">
This feature is common in Chinese platforms, which place a strong emphasis on data security and preventing misuse.
The promotional phrases used, such as:
These phrases refer to the online business culture in China, where concepts like the Gig Economy and quick money-making through online orders are very popular. This type of advertisement is very common in China.
Although the code is written in English, the use of meta tags and design structure suggests a focus on the Chinese market or audiences with access to translation tools.
No references to international standards such as Content Security Policy (CSP) or GDPR are seen in the code. This is typically the case for platforms designed specifically for China due to the different privacy laws in the country.
Based on the evidence provided, this platform is most likely designed and developed in China for Chinese users. The use of meta tags, native libraries, and specific language culture are clear indications supporting this claim.
To: Police Department and Cybercrime Section
From: [Your full name or relevant organization details]
Date: [Date of report submission]
We hereby provide the following information and documentation regarding the investigations conducted on the domain devanholo.com. This report includes the historical changes in the IP address, host, and DNS servers for this domain, which can be used in technical and legal investigations.
Based on the recorded logs, the domain devanholo.com has used the following IP addresses and hosts at different time intervals:
The DNS servers for the domain devanholo.com have changed over different periods as follows:
This report includes all registered changes for the domain devanholo.com from its creation until today. The information provided can be used for tracking suspicious activities, cybercrimes, or any related investigations.
If further information is required, we are ready to cooperate and provide additional documentation.
[Your full name/organization name]
Contact Information: [Email/Phone number]
Signature and stamp (if required)
NetRange: 47.88.0.0 - 47.91.255.255
CIDR: 47.88.0.0/14
NetName: AL-3
NetHandle: NET-47-88-0-0-1
Parent: NET47 (NET-47-0-0-0-0)
NetType: Direct Allocation
OriginAS: Not Available
Organization: Alibaba Cloud LLC (AL-3)
Registration Date: 2015-05-18
Last Updated: 2017-04-26
Reference: 47.88.0.0 ARIN WHOIS
Organization Name: Alibaba Cloud LLC
Organization ID: AL-3
Address: 400 S El Camino Real, Suite 400, San Mateo, CA 94402, USA
Registration Date: 2010-10-29
Last Updated: 2024-11-25
Contact Information:
Reference for NOC: ALIBA-ARIN
Reference for Abuse Contact: NETWO4028-ARIN
NetRange: 47.91.128.0 - 47.91.255.255
CIDR: 47.91.128.0/17
NetName: ALIBABA CLOUD - HK
NetHandle: NET-47-91-128-0-1
Parent: AL-3 (NET-47-88-0-0-1)
NetType: Reassigned
OriginAS: AS45102
Customer: Alibaba Cloud - HK (C06961503)
Registration Date: 2018-04-20
Last Updated: 2024-09-03
Reference: 47.91.128.0 ARIN WHOIS
Customer Name: Alibaba Cloud - HK
Address: 31/F., Tower One, Times Square, 1 Matheson Street, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong
Registration Date: 2018-04-20
Last Updated: 2024-09-03
Reference for Customer: C06961503
This report is based on information obtained from the SSL certificate of the domain devanholo.com. SSL certificates provide valuable information about domain ownership, geographic location, and hosting services, which can assist in identifying the domain owner and related security measures.
Country and Geographic Location: The certificates were issued by two different entities, each with specific geographic information. The certificates issued by Sectigo Limited indicate a connection to the Salford, Greater Manchester, United Kingdom area, which may offer clues to the physical location associated with the domain.
Information on Certificate Issuing Companies: One certificate issuer is Google Trust Services, and the other is Sectigo Limited. This information could help further investigate and identify the domain owner, especially if these companies have specific interactions with individuals or organizations under scrutiny.
This report can aid in police investigations to identify the owner of the domain devanholo.com in several ways:
In conclusion, this report can serve as part of a broader investigation to identify the identity and location of the owner of the domain devanholo.com.
Respectfully, regarding the domain privacy protection services provided by the two companies Nexperian Holding Limited and Alibaba Cloud Computing Co., Ltd., the following is a brief report:
This company is responsible for providing and managing domain privacy protection services. Nexperian complies with ICANN regulations and offers services to users for protecting domain registration contact information, including administrative, technical, and billing contact details. User information is hidden from public view in the WHOIS database to prevent data theft and spam.
This company acts as the domain registrar and is responsible for registering domains and related activities. Alibaba Cloud, as the official representative, activates the domain privacy protection services and receives commissions from service providers such as Nexperian for executing these services.
Both companies cooperate jointly in providing domain privacy protection services. Nexperian designs and manages the privacy protection services, while Alibaba Cloud, acting as the domain registrar, activates these services for users through commissions received. This cooperation aims to protect user privacy and prevent the disclosure of personal information in the WHOIS database.
It is recommended that the cyber police conduct the necessary investigations into how these two companies cooperate and ensure full compliance with privacy laws, preventing any potential violations.
Respectfully,
I would like to provide information regarding an individual named Olivia Thompson, who has been introduced in a complaint related to the system and platform raised by myself.
According to her claims, she is an Australian citizen and has been residing temporarily in Germany with her mother and sister for 13 years. Her alleged residence address in Frankfurt, in the Nordend-West district, is as follows:
Address: Klettenbergstraße 18, Nordend-West, 60322 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Mobile Number: +49 152 13448202
Mobile Service Provider: Lycamobile Germany
Website: www.lycamobile.de
Considering the importance of the matter and the need to verify the claims made, I kindly request that you proceed with inquiring and investigating this information. Any further cooperation or additional information required will be provided by me.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
Respectfully,
[Name and details of the report submitter]
IP Address: 218.98.111.214
Whois Information:
IP Addresses:
Server 1 (jm1.dns.com) is associated with Jinan Jingdi Zhiban, located in Shandong Province, China.
Server 2 (jm2.dns.com) includes two IPs:
Each IP has detailed contact information for abuse and technical support, related to the respective service providers.
Report Date: January 11, 2025
Subject: Unsuccessful Attempts to Access Email Account
Account Name: miralishahidi@outlook.com
Reporter: Mir Ali Shahidi
Reporter's Email Address: info@miralishahidi.ir
Contact Number: 00989360715710
This report includes suspicious activities and unsuccessful attempts to access my email account on the Outlook service. The details of these activities are as follows:
Time: 3 hours before this report was filed
Activity Type: Unsuccessful Login
Device/Platform: Windows
Browser: Firefox
IP Address: 113.76.42.179
Estimated Location: China
Activity Description: Incorrect password entered.
Time: 8:24 AM
Activity Type: Unsuccessful Login
Device/Platform: Android
Browser: Chrome
IP Address: 119.132.143.99
Estimated Location: China
Activity Description: Incorrect password entered.
Times: 11:10 PM, 7:43 PM
Activity Type: Unsuccessful Login
Device/Platform: Android
Browser: Chrome
IP Addresses: 171.42.101.218, 27.156.192.100
Estimated Location: China
Activity Description: Incorrect password entered.
Device/Platform: Android
Browser: Chrome
IP Address: 113.73.108.184
Estimated Location: China
Activity Description: Incorrect password entered.
Device/Platform: Android
Browser: Chrome
IP Address: 49.87.0.242
Estimated Location: China
Activity Description: Incorrect password entered.
Please review this report and take appropriate actions to trace and prevent further illegal activities. The information regarding IP addresses and estimated locations is provided to help identify the intruders.
Thank you,
Mir Ali Shahidi
Email: info@miralishahidi.ir
Contact Number: 00989360715710
Date: [Today's Date]
Claimant: Ms. Olivia Thompson
Claimant's Position: Chief Financial Officer at EXFILE GmbH
Ms. Olivia Thompson claims that she works as the Chief Financial Officer at EXFILE GmbH. According to available information, she is responsible for the company's financial and accounting duties. EXFILE GmbH operates in the field of human resources consulting and is located in Frankfurt, Germany.
Second address of the company: Schumannstraße 27, 60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
Please verify whether Ms. Olivia Thompson is truly employed as the Chief Financial Officer at this company, and also check whether any suspicious or illegal activities have been associated with her and the company. Additionally, kindly take any necessary legal actions if required.
If you require further information or assistance, please feel free to contact me via email [Your Email] or phone [Your Phone Number].
[Your Full Name]
[Date]
Date: [Date of Report]
I, Mir Ali Shahidi, son of [Your Father's Name], born on [Your Date of Birth], with contact number 00989360715710, have experienced repeated telephone harassment over the past ten years from VOIP numbers, which have been calling me frequently and continuously, day and night. These calls, in the form of single rings, have never ceased. I have filed numerous complaints through the complaint systems of the Iranian operators Irancell and Hamrah Aval (as my phone number was transferred to these operators via number portability), the 195 complaint system, the Radio Communications Regulatory Authority, and the Ministry of Communications' complaint system. However, all of these efforts have been in vain.
Recently, however, all the telephone harassment that had been occurring continuously over a long period was suddenly and unexpectedly stopped. It appears that this issue may be related to a fraudulent operation that has been ongoing during this time. Specifically, as many of these single ring calls came from unknown and suspicious numbers, a detailed investigation into the connection between these harassments and potential fraud is necessary.
Based on the information I have gathered, it is suspected that this harassment is related to Chinese and African contractors who cooperate with the country's three major mobile operators (Irancell, Hamrah Aval, and RighTel). It is possible that this issue is directly connected to fraudulent activities that require thorough investigation.
Full Name: Mir Ali Shahidi
Father's Name: [Your Father's Name]
Date of Birth: [Your Date of Birth]
Contact Number: 00989360715710
Address: [Your Full Address]
Email: info@miralishahidi.ir
Thank you,
Mir Ali Shahidi
According to the nslookup search results, the domains v1.juming.com and v2.juming.com both point to the IP address 121.199.255.11.
The IP address 121.199.255.11 belongs to the company Aliyun Computing Co., LTD, which is part of Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co. located in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China.
The IP addresses under this organization range from 121.196.0.0 to 121.199.255.255 and belong to the network AS37963, which is owned by Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co.,Ltd.
According to the Scamalytics report, this IP address is rated with a low fraud risk, and no high-risk services have been reported from these addresses.
The overall fraud risk for these addresses is 0 out of 100, indicating a low likelihood of fraud in the web traffic from these domains.
To report abuse or misconduct, you can contact the email address didong.jc@alibaba-inc.com, which is associated with Aliyun Computing Co., LTD.
This report, containing technical details about the IP address and its connection to potential fraud, is being submitted to the Cyber Police for further investigation if necessary.
Please be informed that based on the technical investigations and reviews conducted, the following information is provided regarding the structure and operations of the reported platform:
The platform's database is decentralized and dispersed across China.
This database features Load Balancing and Fault Tolerance capabilities.
The sustainability and recovery management of this platform's data are handled through BCP (Business Continuity Planning) and DRP (Disaster Recovery Planning).
The database information is updated in real-time through the CDN network in China.
In addition to China, similar databases of this platform in South Africa, Australia, Japan, Iceland, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, California (USA), and others are also connected to the main CDN network located in China and benefit from the same capabilities.
The majority of domain registrations and transfers to the firewall network are done via Cloudflare in its autonomous center in Hong Kong.
To date, over 200 links related to this platform have been transferred to the Cloudflare firewall network through DNS servers.
The primary DNS servers of this platform are located in China.
All reported domains are directly connected to the internet from these servers and the main IPs mentioned in previous reports.
The operators of this platform are highly specialized individuals in the following fields:
The majority of these individuals are Chinese and hold advanced positions such as university professors, PhD holders, and engineering doctorate holders.
Given the advanced nature and complex technical structure of this platform, legal and technical actions are required to identify the perpetrators and prevent further operation of this fraud network.
It is recommended to:
Thank you and best regards,
[Reporter’s Name]
[Contact Information]
Introduction:
This report is prepared to provide detailed technical information about a complex fraud network. Evidence indicates that there are connections between databases located in South Africa and Chinese CDN networks. This connection is established repeatedly through specified DNS servers and using advanced Synchronize methods.
According to the conducted investigations, one of the IP addresses associated with the mentioned network is as follows:
IP Address: 168.76.253.108
IP Address Owner:
NetRange: 168.76.0.0 - 168.76.255.255
NetName: AFRINIC-168-76-0-0
NetHandle: NET-168-76-0-0-1
NetType: Transferred to AfriNIC
Organization: African Network Information Center (AFRINIC)
RegDate: 2005-02-21
This IP range is managed by AFRINIC and is assigned to an organization in South Africa called Free State Education Department.
Organization Owner:
This IP address and its associated domains are connected to the Chinese CDN network via Chinese DNS servers.
Database synchronization operations between the main servers in China and this range occur in real-time and repeatedly.
More than 200 similar domains have been identified in previous reports that have established similar connections through Chinese DNS servers to the network.
This report indicates that the operators of this fraud network use advanced techniques in database management and network communications. Those associated with this platform are likely experts in AI and computer science and are utilizing modern technologies to obscure and distribute data. Immediate investigation and legal action are recommended to halt these operations.
Date: January 14, 2025
The IP address 154.92.40.104, examined on January 14, 2025, through the whois tool, shows that it belongs to a foreign company named Digital Core Technology Co., Limited, based in Hong Kong. Although this IP address is managed by AfriNIC (the African Network Information Center), no connection to African activities or African government entities is observed.
This IP address is managed by AfriNIC, which is responsible for assigning IP addresses to African countries. However, this IP address belongs to a company based in Hong Kong. Therefore, AfriNIC, as the Whois registry for Africa, only stores information related to IP address assignments, even if the owner is outside the African continent.
This situation may arise due to AfriNIC allocating IP resources to companies that operate outside Africa, but nonetheless, this IP address does not indicate any documented suspicious or illegal activities by an African entity.
This IP address belongs to Digital Core Technology Co., Limited, based in Hong Kong. To report any violations or illegal activities related to this IP address, please contact the company's support team via email at abuse@cloudinnovation.org.
Since no information indicating illegal activities or cyber threats has been clearly extracted from this IP address, it is recommended to conduct a more detailed investigation and, if necessary, take further actions to trace and analyze the traffic associated with this address.
If additional information or reporting is required, the Cyber Police team can use available resources to monitor and follow up on activities related to this IP address.
IP Address: 47.104.252.109
This IP address is under the supervision of Alibaba Network and belongs to Aliyun Computing Co., LTD in China. In case of any security issues or harassment through this IP, reports can be made via the email didong.jc@alibaba-inc.com.
If this IP address has been used in cyber-attacks or legal violations, the Cyber Police or APNIC can be informed.
This report identifies Australia as the registration location for the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC). APNIC is a non-profit organization responsible for allocating and managing IP addresses in the Asia Pacific region. It is headquartered in Australia and is tasked with overseeing and allocating IP resources to various countries in the region.
Therefore, Australia plays an indirect role as the global IP address registry and is involved in registering and maintaining information for IPs like the mentioned address (47.104.252.109) due to hosting APNIC.
This is a complete report on the subject from me, Mir Ali Shahidi. About three weeks ago, I received a contact via WhatsApp messenger. In this contact, a 29-year-old woman of Australian origin who had migrated to Frankfurt, Germany, reached out to me. She stated that she planned to travel to Iran for 25 days during the end-of-year holidays. She claimed that through one of her relatives (referred to as "She"), I was introduced as a reliable person, and she requested that I accompany her as a trusted companion during her stay in Iran. During these conversations, she talked about her job and income and also suggested introducing me to cryptocurrency and working on the website devanholo.com. To begin, she temporarily and securely provided me with her personal account so I could familiarize myself with how this system works. Over a few days, she taught me how to use the e-commerce and online trading system. Additionally, she fully introduced me to AI software related to these activities and recommended the Transform exchange network in Iran as a secure and reputable platform for cryptocurrency transactions. When I started working with this system, I initially encountered some challenges, but they were gradually resolved. Since I am an expert in computer networks, network security, and information security management, even though I am currently unemployed, I saw this as a suitable opportunity to take advantage of and start working in this type of trade. All relevant documentation for this matter is available, but it is a very complex and extensive issue. Despite this, my communication with this person and the involved parties from their side is still ongoing.
The website devanholo.com was introduced to me for buying and selling goods. This site used three reputable stores—Amazon, Alibaba, and AliExpress—for ordering products. To complete the orders, I was required to make payments in Tether cryptocurrency, completing 25 orders determined by the company. After completing the orders, the company would pay a percentage of the profit as a commission, and the funds would become available for withdrawal. The company's condition was that all 25 orders must be fully completed for the funds to be withdrawable. Additionally, some orders contained 1 to 3 combined orders, which increased the payment amount.
I completed this process three times without any issues, but during the fourth round, I was given 4 combined orders, even though the number of combined orders should not exceed 3. Nevertheless, I completed all the orders and paid the required amount in Tether cryptocurrency. However, when I requested a withdrawal, the withdrawal system was locked, and the company demanded a 25% payment of the total principal investment and received commission as tax.
The total amount I deposited is approximately $30,000 USD or its equivalent in Tether cryptocurrency. The company has requested payment of 19,300 Tether (equivalent to $19,300 USD) as tax and stated that withdrawals will not be possible until the tax is fully paid.
The approximate total amount invested is about $30,000 USD, and the approximate profit from the commission of this investment is about $50,000 USD.
Given these conditions, there is a very high probability that I have become a victim of an online and international scam. It appears that the individuals behind this website might be from within the country and possibly from among academic elites or credible domestic figures. Screenshots and relevant documents are also available.
The operators of the website devanholo.com claim that they are an international business company, with their headquarters located in the financial and economic city of London. According to my research, the independent financial and economic city in London, known as The City Of London, is located in the center of London and operates autonomously from the main governance of the UK. This city has its own independent ruler and mayor, but despite these features, it is still under direct supervision of the UK’s tax authority, HMRC.
The company owning the domain devanholo.com claims that all their activities are legal. Since the domain registration of the company is verifiable with the most reputable organizations such as ICAAN and IANA, and the domain is registered with the well-known international organization Verisign, this website is considered legitimate. Additionally, the domain connection is managed by the international company Dynadot, one of the most reputable web hosting services. The company's private information is kept confidential to ensure privacy and security, and public disclosure has been prevented for various reasons. Therefore, requests for the names of the domain owners and operators can be made through legal channels and judicial orders.
Regarding the website's operations, the company claims that I, as an investor and provider of requested goods, have made investments using cryptocurrency, specifically USDT, on their platform. According to their claim, the buying and selling process will result in the exchange of money and goods through my initial investment. My role as the initial investor in the fintech system is clear, and after completing the order, the principal and commission from the sale of goods will be credited to my account and made available for withdrawal. They stated that to prevent unhealthy competition, the financing of orders is done randomly using smart algorithms to avoid favoritism and to ensure that the person placing the order is not involved in directing orders.
The condition for investment and full withdrawal of both the principal and commission depends on the completion of the orders as quickly as possible. The investment range on the platform is also clearly defined. For Amazon, it ranges from 20 USDT to 499 USDT, for Alibaba from 499 USDT to 899 USDT, and for AliExpress, it is 899 USDT and above. The total principal and commission balance are only accessible during specific periods, granting the company the right to fund and assign product orders.
Regarding account security, the company claims that all security measures are carefully followed. My problem arose when all my investments, rules, and orders were completed, and it was time to withdraw the principal and commission. When I attempted to withdraw, they claimed that I had to pay taxes. I had no obligation to pay income tax or digital currency import taxes to the UK. However, they stated that according to UK tax tables, I had to pay 25% of the total amount as a separate tax.
Since I had no authority to deduct or lock the 25% of my total assets in my account, I requested that they deduct this amount, but they claimed this would constitute tax evasion. Eventually, I was told that after paying the tax amount, a tax receipt would be sent to me, and my assets along with the commission would be returned to my account.
Given these circumstances, I have filed a legal complaint to ensure that the matter is thoroughly investigated and resolved.
This report examines the similarities and proximity of the physical addresses of two companies, Alibaba Cloud LLC and Dynadot. These companies operate in the fields of cloud services and domain registration, and considering the geographical similarities and physical locations of their offices in California, this analysis can assist in understanding issues related to networking and organizational communications.
Physical Address: 400 S El Camino Real, Suite 400, San Mateo, CA 94402, USA
Registration Date: 2010-10-29
Last Update: 2024-11-25
Description: The headquarters of Alibaba Cloud LLC is located in San Mateo, California. The company is one of the largest global cloud service providers, and its activities in this region are monitored by various organizations. At this address, various services such as data processing, cloud services, and technical aspects of network communications are offered.
Physical Address: 210 S Ellsworth Ave #345, San Mateo, CA 94401, United States
Working Hours: 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM Pacific Standard Time (PST)
Description: The headquarters of Dynadot is also located in San Mateo, California. This company, specializing in domain registration and web hosting, provides its services to global customers. At this address, services such as domain registration, web hosting, and technical support for users are provided.
Since both companies are located in the same geographical region in California, there is a possibility that security issues or abuse of services may occur through similar networks or even through shared business relationships between the two companies. For reporting purposes, both companies provide similar contact methods for their technical teams and different departments.
The proximity of their addresses in a specific geographical area may indicate possible business collaborations between the two companies. It is also possible that these two companies leverage similar infrastructure or technical collaborations in data processing and domain registration.
Due to the geographical proximity and similar services, there is a possibility that the companies use similar infrastructure for their internal networks and technical communications, which can assist cybersecurity analysts. Technical contacts with similar email addresses, such as aliops-goc@list.alibaba-inc.com for Alibaba and info@dynadot.com for Dynadot, may help establish a pattern for tracking security issues and analyzing threats.
Given the geographical proximity of the addresses of Alibaba Cloud LLC and Dynadot in San Mateo, California, and the structural similarities in their technical services and organizational communications, especially in cloud networking and domain registration, cyber police can use this information to identify, monitor, and investigate security issues and cyber abuses.
The geographical proximity of these two companies and the existence of similar patterns in abuse reporting can help quickly identify cyber threats, unauthorized business collaborations, or unauthorized access to information. For cyber police, investigating network issues and abuses of resources from these companies, while considering geographical proximity and registered information, is of great importance.
Date: [Today's Date]
To: [Relevant Authority or Police Department]
Subject: Tracking the devanholo.com Domain via Wayback Machine
Dear Sir/Madam,
I, Mir Ali Shahidi, have investigated the domain devanholo.com through the website https://web.archive.org (Wayback Machine). The purpose of this tracking was to gather historical information about this domain and clarify its current status.
Based on the results obtained, I request that further actions be taken to investigate the status of this domain and check its ownership status, especially regarding legal and security activities.
Kindly direct that the necessary follow-up actions be carried out, and additional information be provided if needed.
Thank you and best regards,
Mir Ali Shahidi
Expertise: Senior Expert in Information Management and Network Security
Email: info@miralishahidi.ir
Phone: 00989360715710
In China, websites must be registered in specific systems to obtain their ICP license. To check the details of a website and its owner, you can use the official websites listed below:
This is the official website of China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), which provides domain registration information for ICPs.
If the domain is officially registered in the WHOIS system, you can use WHOIS services to search for owner information.
Use websites like whois.icann.org or whois.domaintools.com.
If WHOIS or ICP information is unavailable, you can contact the domain registrar to request further information.
Some online services, like DomainTools, may assist you in finding domain history and additional details.
The code 琼ICP备19004455号-1 is a registration license number for a website in China, related to the "ICP" (Internet Content Provider) system.
This code indicates that the website is legally registered in China and is under the supervision of the relevant authorities.
Using WHOIS services, you can view initial information, including registration date, expiration date, and recent changes. Websites like:
DomainTools is an advanced service that provides more detailed information about domain history. It allows you to check ownership changes, DNS modifications, registration history, and more.
Some services, such as DomainTools, store archived WHOIS information. By using a subscription or special accounts, you can find the domain's historical changes and previous details.
Some websites, like Wayback Machine, are used to store previous versions of websites.
If WHOIS information is private, you can contact the domain registrar mentioned in the WHOIS results to request the initial registration date.
Overall, WHOIS services and tools like DomainTools and Wayback Machine are suitable for accessing valuable domain history information.