

Base Jumping

Attacking the GSM baseband and base station grugq@coseinc.com



Overview

- *GSM
- Base Station
- Base Band
- *Conclusion




GSM: The Protocol




Documents

- Dozens of docs
- Thousands of pages
- Important one (defines L3)
 - *GSM 04 08











Logical Channels

Broadcast Channels (BCH)

Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH)

Frequency Correction Channel (FCCH)

Synchronization Channel (SCH)

Cell Broadcast Channel (CBCH)



Logical Channels, cont.

* Common Control Channels (CCCH)

Paging Channel (PCH)

Random Access Channel (RACH)

Access Grant Channel (AGCH)



Logical Channels, cont.

Standalone Dedicated Control Channel (SDCCH)

Associated Control Channel (ACCH)

Fast Associated Control Channel (FACCH)

Slow Associated Control Channel (SACCH)



GSM Channels


- Opening a channel is slow
 - Can take seconds
- *Specific channels for specific uses




Opening a channel

















































Base Station Sub-System **BSS**








Mobile Identifiers


MCC	MNC	MSIN
3 digits	2 or 3 digits	Max 10 digits

IM	IEI	
TAC	SNR	Spare
8 Digits	6 Digits	1 Digit










































GSM Attacks







RACHell

- Request channel allocation
- Flood the BSS with requests
- First announced by Dieter Spaar at DeepSec
- *Prevent everyone from using that cell



RACHell





























```
Cell information
NCO: 0 NMO: 1
MSC Rev: 99+ SGSN Rev: 99+
Cell DTM support: No EDGE supp
Cell 54684 Arfcn=96 PCH Period
last EGPRS TBF:
UL: Cs=MCS2 tfi=16 Bsn= 0 Slo
Slot 1 V(s)=3 v(r)=1
Arfcns: 96
T3312: 00:14:34
T3314: --:--:--
GSM Last SDCCH:
```



```
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GSM Last SDCCH:
```

Our Target




Demo - RACHell



- *Send IMSI ATTACH messages
- *pre-authentication
- Overload the HLR/VLR infrastructure
- *Prevent everyone using the network


































- Send multiple Location Update Requests including a spoofed IMSI
 - Unauthenticated
- Prevent SIM from receiving calls and SMS
- *Discovered by Sylvain Munaut
































How hard to get an IMSI?

Supports MCC / MNC MSC IMSI.





Baseband Fuzzing




How to make a smartphone





Two separate computers





Two separate computers





Baseband

- Controls the radio
- Separate CPU and code base
- *RTOS
- Written in C
- *Typically legacy code base (decades)



GSM Frame Delivery

- *OpenBTS + XML-RPC
 - *Ich_open(char * IMSI)
 - *lch_send(int fd, char *buf, size_t len)
 - *Ich_recv(int fd, char *buf, size_t len)
 - *Ich_close(int fd)



GSM Fuzzing Framework

- *USRP + OpenBTS for delivery
- *GSM900 band
- *BugMine case generation & mutation
- No Instrumentation
 - Very bad visibility on bugs



Coseinc GSM FuzzFarm


- Targetting
 - *iPhone
 - *HTC (Android)
 - *Palm Pre
 - Blackberry
 - *Nokia















Conclusion



GSM Trouble

- *GSM is no longer a walled garden
- *GSM spec has security problems
- *Expect many more issues as OSS reduces costs for entry



Future work

- More GSM stack fuzzing
- Next gen protocol stacks



Thanks to

Harald Welte, Osmocom-bb & OpenBTS



Questions?